Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series

April 05, 2018

Voice input for authentication
Nick Felker
Shuyang Chen
Sachit Mishra

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
Recommended Citation
Felker, Nick; Chen, Shuyang; and Mishra, Sachit, "Voice input for authentication", Technical Disclosure Commons, (April 05, 2018)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1128

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

Felker et al.: Voice input for authentication

Voice input for authentication
ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen a proliferation of systems designed to respond to voice, e.g.,
smart speakers, smartphones, and other voice-activated devices. Such systems are convenient
and intuitive to use. However, they also open the possibility for malicious actors to gain control
of sensitive information through fraudulent use of speech commands. For example, a malicious
actor can spoof the voice recognition system through a recording of the user’s voice or by using
a computer to synthesize the speech mimicking the user. The techniques of this disclosure
thwart such attacks by providing a random phrase for the user to repeat and verifying the
resulting audio and transcription for authenticity. Spoofed audio sounds choppy and exhibits
sharp transitions, while authentic audio is smooth and lacks unnatural artifacts. A trained
machine learning model is used to tell the difference.
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BACKGROUND
Voice recognition systems are increasingly integrated into consumer devices, with the
result that systems designed to respond to voice, e.g., smartphones, smart speakers, smart
assistants, internet-of-things (IoT) devices, etc., are now nearly ubiquitous. Such voice
recognition and response systems match users based on a given voice fingerprint. Although
convenient and intuitive to use, use of voice recognition technologies open up the possibility of
malicious actors fraudulently using the voice user interface to perform unauthorized actions.
For example, a malicious actor may compile a unique query in a user’s voice by splicing
together unrelated voice recordings of the user. Alternatively, a malicious actor could use a
computer to synthesize text that approximates the user’s speech. For sensitive applications of
voice-enabled systems, e.g., financial transactions, such spoofing can enable a malicious actor
to perform undesirable actions.
DESCRIPTION
The techniques of this disclosure enable users to protect sensitive actions from being
performed over a voice user interface without authorization. Prior to responding to or
completing a user request, the voice user interface asks the user to utter a randomly generated
phrase. The audio of the user response is checked using trained machine learning models to
verify validity of the transcription and smoothness of the audio. With a spoofed audio track,
e.g., where several audio recordings are spliced together, the audio sounds choppy or exhibits
sharp changes at transition points. These types of artifacts are identified using the trained
machine learning model, and if detected, are used to reject the user’s request. The techniques
described herein, to authenticate users over a voice interface, are referred to as audio
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CAPTCHAs (“Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart”).
Voice input from the user is obtained and utilized for the purpose of responding to user
commands. Recording of user uttered speech, if necessary, is performed only if permitted by
the user. Such recordings are utilized for the purpose of responding to user requests, and are
retained for a limited period of time, if permitted by the user.

Fig. 1: Authentication over a voice user interface
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Fig. 1 illustrates authentication over a voice user interface, per techniques of this
disclosure. A user (102), claiming authenticity, queries or requests access to a device using a
voice user interface (104). The voice user interface responds by issuing a challenge (106) to
prove authenticity, e.g., requesting the user to repeat a randomly generated phrase. The phrase
is designed to last only for a few seconds and includes words that typically don’t occur together
in normal usage. These attributes of the challenge phrase make it difficult for a malicious actor
to generate a matching audio clip that sounds smooth.
The user utters the phrase (108). The user has a small time window, e.g., a few seconds,
to complete utterance of the challenge phrase. A small time window for response increases the
difficulty for a malicious actor to splice together or synthesize mimicked speech. The voice user
interface receives the uttered phrase (110) and tests it for authenticity (112).
Authenticity is tested by checking for smoothness within the captured audio, and
checking for unnatural artifacts such as sharp transitions within the captured audio. Natural
speech by a true user is smooth and free of sharp transitions. A trained machine learning model
determines if the received phrase originates from previously recorded clips by identifying
whether the audio came from a person or from an electronic speaker. Metrics such volume,
frequency, noise levels, etc. are used to make the determination relating to authenticity.
If the captured audio is determined to have originated from a true user, then the user’s
access request is admitted (116), and the correct audio response to the challenge added to the
training set of the user’s voice fingerprint model (114), if permitted by the user. Addition of the
correct audio response to the training set continually improves the accuracy of the user’s voice
fingerprint. If authentication fails, the user is denied access (118).
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Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the
user to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or features described herein
may enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s social network,
social actions or activities, profession, a user’s preferences, or a user’s current location), and if
the user is sent content or communications from a server. In addition, certain data may be
treated in one or more ways before it is stored or used, so that personally identifiable
information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may be treated so that no personally
identifiable information can be determined for the user, or a user’s geographic location may be
generalized where location information is obtained (such as to a city, ZIP code, or state level),
so that a particular location of a user cannot be determined. Thus, the user may have control
over what information is collected about the user, how that information is used, and what
information is provided to the user.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure provides techniques that protect devices with voice user interfaces
against unauthorized access. When a user requests access or issues a command to a device over
a voice interface, the techniques request the user to repeat a phrase comprising randomly
selected words. The phrase is designed such that it is difficult to artificially synthesize without
introducing artifacts. A true user uttering the phrase is identified as such by a trained machine
learning model that tests for attributes such as smoothness of captured audio, presence or
absence of artifacts, etc. Upon successful verification, the user’s request is admitted.
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